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Testing Applicants with Disabilities
Abstract
All jurisdictions provide reasonableaccommodations for applicants with disabilities who are otherwise
qualified to sit for the bar examination. The provision of accommodations is primarily a result of the
comprehensive federal law known as the Americans with Disabilities Act (“the ADA”), passed by Congress in
1990 to prohibit discrimination against persons with disabilities. The ADA protects both applicants with
physical disabilities and those with mental disabilities, and accommodations include not only additional
testing time, longer and more frequent breaks between testing sessions, and private testing rooms, but also
other auxiliary aids and services designed to enable effective communication to and from bar examination
applicants.
Prior to the adoption of the ADA in 1990, jurisdictions provided accommodations primarily to applicants
with physical disabilities, including visual and motor impairments. While applicants have continued to
request accommodations for physical disabilities under the ADA, the more challenging cases for bar
examiners arise when applicants claim they have mental impairments, as those impairments are not always
easily diagnosed or documented. A more detailed discussion of how the ADA affects testing accommodations
for bar examination applicants follows, with recommendations as to how bar examiners should address
requests for accommodations from applicants with disabilities.
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A
ll jurisdictions provide reasonable
accommodations for applicants with
disabilities who are otherwise quali-
fied to sit for the bar examination. The
provision of accommodations is primarily a result of
the comprehensive federal law
known as the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“the ADA”),
passed by Congress in 1990 to
prohibit discrimination against
persons with disabilities. The
ADA protects both applicants
with physical disabilities and
those with mental disabilities,
and accommodations include
not only additional testing time,
longer and more frequent breaks
between testing sessions, and
private testing rooms, but also
other auxiliary aids and services designed to enable
effective communication to and from bar examination
applicants.
Prior to the adoption of the ADA in 1990, juris-
dictions provided accommodations primarily to
applicants with physical disabilities, including 
visual and motor impairments. While applicants
have continued to request accommodations for
physical disabilities under the ADA, the more 
challenging cases for bar examiners arise when
applicants claim they have mental impairments, as
those impairments are not always easily diagnosed
or documented. A more detailed discussion of how
the ADA affects testing accommodations for bar
examination applicants follows,
with recommendations as to
how bar examiners should
address requests for accommo-
dations from applicants with dis-
abilities. 
INTRODUCTION1
The Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA)2 is the most compre-
hensive piece of civil rights legis-
lation prohibiting discrimination
against persons with disabilities.
The ADA consists of Title I,
which prohibits discrimination in employment; Title
II, which prohibits discrimination by public entities;
and Title III, which prohibits discrimination in pub-
lic accommodations by private entities. Unlike its
predecessor, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,3 the ADA
covers public entities that do not receive federal
funding, including boards of bar examiners. Since
taking effect on July 26, 1992, the ADA and its relat-
ed regulations have provided bar examiners with an
infrastructure for administering examinations to
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WHILE APPLICANTS HAVE CON-
TINUED TO REQUEST ACCOMMO-
DATIONS FOR PHYSICAL DISABILI-
TIES UNDER THE ADA, THE MORE
CHALLENGING CASES FOR BAR
EXAMINERS ARISE WHEN APPLI-
CANTS CLAIM THEY HAVE MENTAL
IMPAIRMENTS, AS THOSE IMPAIR-
MENTS ARE NOT ALWAYS EASILY
DIAGNOSED OR DOCUMENTED.
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applicants with disabilities, as well as for conducting
non-discriminatory character and fitness investiga-
tions.4
Title II of the ADA prohibits public entities from
denying disabled persons access to or participation
in services or programs run or sponsored by such
entities.5 The statute defines public entities as
“instrumentalities of a State”;6 these entities include
boards of bar examiners, which are delegated
authority over bar admissions by state supreme
courts in accordance with individual state statutes
and constitutions. All courts that
have addressed the question of
whether Title II covers state
boards of bar examiners have
found it applicable.7 No state
board has ever challenged the
applicability of Title II to its
administrative functions.
The applicability of Title III
is less clear. Section 12189 of
Title III states that “any person
that offers examinations . . .
related to . . . licensing . . . for
professional purposes shall offer
such examinations . . . in a place and manner acces-
sible to persons with disabilities or [offer] alternative
accessible arrangements [to] such individuals.”8
Congress intended for Title III to regulate “private
entities” (which would exclude state boards of bar
examiners),9 and the U.S. Department of Justice regu-
lations promulgated under § 12189 appear to apply
only to private entities that administer examinations.10
However, § 12189 also refers to “any person that
offers examinations,” and defines “any person” as
including “government and government agencies.”11
Because boards of bar examiners receive their
authority from state supreme courts and state consti-
tutions, they are “government agencies” and there-
fore “persons” under the ADA.
Despite the view of some federal district courts12
and at least two United States Supreme Court jus-
tices (Justices Scalia and Thomas)13 that boards of bar
examiners fall within the scope of Title III, the leg-
islative history of the ADA suggests that Congress
intended for Title III to protect against discrimina-
tion in public accommodations by all groups not
covered under Title II.14 If that
interpretation is correct, Title III
does not cover boards of bar
examiners because they are cov-
ered by Title II. Until it is
resolved whether Title III covers
bar examiners, obligatory com-
pliance with Title III most likely
rests with the facilities where
applicants take the bar exam,
such as hotels that provide space
for administering the examina-
tion, and not with bar examiners
themselves.15 Therefore, the focus
of the analysis in this article will be on Title II, but
there is likely no material difference between a bar
examination applicant’s substantive rights under
Titles II and III, if both are found to cover state boards
of bar examiners.
In practice, the ADA requires bar examiners to
extend “reasonable accommodations” to applicants
with disabilities so as to level the playing field rela-
tive to non-disabled applicants, without giving
applicants with disabilities an unfair advantage. The
ADA also prohibits bar examiners, when conducting
IN PRACTICE, THE ADA
REQUIRES BAR EXAMINERS TO
EXTEND “REASONABLE ACCOM-
MODATIONS” TO APPLICANTS
WITH DISABILITIES SO AS TO LEVEL
THE PLAYING FIELD RELATIVE TO
NON-DISABLED APPLICANTS,
WITHOUT GIVING APPLICANTS
WITH DISABILITIES AN UNFAIR
ADVANTAGE.
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character and fitness investigations, from consider-
ing any aspect of an applicant’s character unrelated
to the applicant’s fitness to practice law.
This article analyzes the infrastructure of Title II
of the ADA and discusses its implications for bar
examiners. Part 1 defines the statute’s critical terms,
while Part 2 describes how courts have applied those
terms to bar examination applicants who require
testing accommodations. Part 3 contains a discussion
of some ADA-related constitutional and procedural
issues raised in litigation between bar examination
applicants with disabilities and boards of bar exam-
iners. Part 4 consists of practical suggestions for bar
examiners wishing to comply with the ADA when
deciding on requests for testing accommodations
from applicants with disabilities. Last, Part 5 dis-
cusses some limitations that the ADA places on bar
examiners in their character and fitness evaluations
of applicants, although this is an area of the law that
is not fully developed.
PART 1: DEFINITIONS
According to the ADA, any bar examination appli-
cant with a disability who is otherwise qualified to
sit for a state bar examination has the right to rea-
sonable accommodations when taking the exam. It is
therefore necessary to understand the statute’s defi-
nitions of “disability,” “otherwise qualified,” and
“reasonable accommodations.” 
Disability 
The ADA defines “disability” as: 
(A) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of [an] individual; (B) a record
of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded
as having such an impairment.16
The law covers physical disabilities, including (i)
“[p]hysiological disorder[s] or condition[s]” (e.g.,
blindness, deafness); (ii) “[c]osmetic disfigurement”;
and (iii) “[a]natomical loss” (e.g., loss of an eye, para-
plegia);17 and mental disabilities, including “mental
or psychological disorder[s] such as mental retarda-
tion, organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental
illness, and specific learning disabilities” (e.g.,
autism, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder,
schizophrenia, dyslexia).18 Interestingly, the law pro-
tects even those applicants who have been misdiag-
nosed as disabled (if diagnostic records exist), as well
as applicants who have overcome their disabilities.
In all cases, bar examination applicants who file
ADA-based lawsuits against state boards of bar
examiners must prove the existence of a “disability”
requiring the requested accommodation(s).19
The critical task for bar examiners is to evaluate
an applicant’s impairment in light of all available
mitigating or corrective measures, including artificial
mitigating measures (e.g., medicines and mechanical
devices such as ritalin, insulin, glasses, and hearing
aids) and natural measures available to all applicants
(e.g., extra study, additional sleep, relaxation exer-
cises, diet). Bar examiners can find some guidance
from McGuinness v. University of New Mexico School of
Medicine,20 a case in which the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit decided that test anxi-
ety is not a “disability” under the ADA when it is
possible to counteract the symptoms with additional
studying. 
The United States Supreme Court expanded on
the principle outlined in McGuinness in three com-
panion cases, essentially ruling that lower courts
cannot categorically evaluate impairments in their
uncorrected states.21 In Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.,
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the airline refused to hire two twin sisters as pilots
because they each had uncorrected vision of 20/200
or worse in the right eye and 20/400 or worse in the
left eye—both below the company’s requirement of
uncorrected 20/100 vision or better in each eye. The
Court ruled that the sisters did not have “impair-
ments” requiring protection under the ADA because
both had at least 20/20 vision in each eye with cor-
rective lenses. In Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,22 the
Court found that a truck driver’s untreatable ambly-
opia (an eye disease resulting in monocular vision)
qualified as an “impairment” under the ADA.
However, it also found that the impairment did not
“substantially limit” the driver in any “major life
activity” because of the coping mechanisms that he
had developed in response to the disease.
After deciding those cases, the United States
Supreme Court further narrowed the definition of
“disability” in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky,
Inc. v. Williams.23 Diagnosed with several nerve disor-
ders, including carpal tunnel syndrome, the plaintiff
in Toyota sued her employer, Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, under the ADA. She claimed that
Toyota had required her to continue such manual
tasks as inspecting, wiping, and adding oil to new
automobiles despite its knowledge of her impair-
ment. In ruling against the employee, the Court held
that while her impairment interfered with the per-
formance of work-related manual tasks, it did not
render her “unable to perform the variety of [manu-
al] tasks central to most people’s daily lives.”24 In that
particular case, the Court refused to consider
whether the plaintiff’s impairment “substantially
limit[ed]” her capabilities in the “major life activity”
of working. However, in Sutton v. United Airlines,
Inc., the Court did consider that issue and noted that
“[w]hen the major life activity under consideration is
working, the statutory phrase ‘substantially limits’
requires . . . that plaintiffs allege that they are unable
to work in a broad class of jobs.”25 Similarly, bar
examination applicants seeking testing accommoda-
tions must prove that their impairments have sub-
stantially impeded or precluded them from perform-
ing physical or mental tasks of central importance to
their daily lives, and not tasks that are tied only to
taking the bar examination or practicing law.
Bar examiners and courts have also wrestled
with the appropriate universe of comparison when
deciding whether testing applicants have “disabili-
ties.” In evaluating whether a bar examination appli-
cant’s impairment “substantially limits one or more
major life activities,” should a comparison be made
with other applicants or to average persons in the
general population? A bar examination applicant
with a reading impairment might read quite slowly
in comparison to other applicants (thus qualifying as
“disabled”), but might nonetheless read quickly
compared to average persons in the general popula-
tion (therefore not qualifying).
The two federal circuit courts that have consid-
ered the relevant universe in testing accommoda-
tions cases agree that when the “major life activity”
in question is reading or learning, the applicant’s
impairment should be measured against the average
person in the general population.26 However, those
courts gave conflicting rulings when the “major life
activity” in question involved the workplace. In
Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law Examiners,27 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit compared an applicant’s learning impair-
ment against persons having “comparable training,
skills[] and ability” (e.g., other bar examination
applicants). But in Gonzales v. National Board of 
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Medical Examiners,28 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit compared an applicant
for a medical licensing examination to the average
person in the general population. Bar examination
applicants arguing that they are “substantially limit-
ed” in the “major life activity” of working will rely
on Bartlett when litigating outside of the Sixth
Circuit, while bar examiners litigating outside of the
Second Circuit will use Gonzales for support.29 Most
commentators who have considered the issue believe
that the average person in the general population is
the appropriate measure for comparison, regardless
of which “major life activity” is involved.30
Otherwise Qualified
According to the ADA, a bar
examination applicant with a
“disability” should receive ac-
commodations only if he or she
is “otherwise qualified” to sit for
the bar examination. The ADA
applies to:
[a]n individual with a dis-
ability who, with or without
reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or
practices, . . . or the provision of auxiliary
aids and services, meets the essential eligibil-
ity requirements for the receipt of services or
the participation in programs or activities
provided by a public entity.31
Here the service or activity is taking the bar exami-
nation. An “otherwise qualified individual” is any
applicant who has a “disability” and has satisfied the
state board’s “essential eligibility requirements”
(e.g., is of the minimum age, holds a degree from an
accredited law school, has paid an exam fee) for tak-
ing the bar examination. In one instance, a federal
appellate court confused the issue of an applicant’s
qualifications to sit for the bar examination with her
qualifications for bar membership. In Clement v.
Virginia Board of Bar Examiners,32 an applicant with a
learning disability failed the Virginia bar examina-
tion six times, despite the fact that the board provid-
ed her greater accommodations each time she sat for
the exam. On her sixth and final attempt, the board
permitted her to take the examination over four days
instead of two, and to take three-hour rest breaks
between the morning and afternoon testing sessions
each day. After failing the exam for the sixth time, the
applicant argued to the court that she should have
been permitted to take the exam-
ination over seven days (four
days of testing with alternate
days of rest). In finding for the
Virginia board, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit found that the applicant
failed to show that she was “oth-
erwise qualified for Bar member-
ship.” Under the ADA, the appli-
cant’s qualifications to join the
Virginia bar were not relevant.
The appropriate question was whether she was “oth-
erwise qualified” to sit for the Virginia bar examina-
tion. The Fourth Circuit made a similar mistake in
interpreting the “otherwise qualified” requirement
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. In Pandazides v.
Virginia Board of Education,33 the court held that a
determination of whether an individual taking a
teaching certification examination was “otherwise
qualified” required, in part, a factual inquiry into
whether she could perform the “essential functions”
of a teacher. 
The Fourth Circuit misinterpreted the “other-
wise qualified” requirement in both Pandazides and
MOST COMMENTATORS WHO
HAVE CONSIDERED THE ISSUE
BELIEVE THAT THE AVERAGE
PERSON IN THE GENERAL POPU-
LATION IS THE APPROPRIATE
MEASURE FOR COMPARISON,
REGARDLESS OF WHICH “MAJOR
LIFE ACTIVITY” IS INVOLVED.30
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Clement: nowhere does the ADA require that appli-
cants for professional licensure examinations
demonstrate qualifications or abilities to practice
their chosen professions. Applicants must only satis-
fy the criteria spelled out by state licensing boards
for taking the licensing examination. Because states
use the bar examination as one measure of whether
applicants are qualified to practice law, the only
ADA-related issues pertinent to bar examiners (aside
from character and fitness) are whether applicants
with disabilities are qualified to sit for the bar exam-
ination, and, if so, whether they require reasonable
accommodations. 
Reasonable Accommodations
According to the ADA, if appli-
cants with disabilities are “other-
wise qualified” to sit for the bar
examination, state boards must
provide them with “reasonable
accommodations” to avoid dis-
criminating against them. Such
accommodations include “rea-
sonable modifications in poli-
cies, practices, or procedures
when the modifications are nec-
essary to avoid discrimination because of [a] disabil-
ity” (e.g., additional breaks, separate testing room,
Braille print or the assistance of a reader, access to a
computer or a typewriter);34 reasonable accommoda-
tions also include increasing the length of time per-
mitted for completing the examination.35
Understanding what constitutes “reasonable
accommodations” under the ADA requires guidance
from the courts. Consistent with recent case law, bar
examiners should give “primary consideration” to
the accommodations requested by applicants with
disabilities if the accommodations are supported by
credible medical opinion.36 State boards may offer
alternative accommodations if accommodations are
not requested out of necessity, and if the requested
accommodations (i) impose too great a financial bur-
den; (ii) threaten the security of the bar examination;
or (iii) challenge the validity or fairness of the exam-
ination.37 When an applicant mounts a legal chal-
lenge to alternative accommodations offered by a
state board, the board must prove that the accommo-
dations requested by the applicant are unreason-
able.38 Thus, boards must carefully consider on a
case-by-case basis how to accommodate individual
applicants in light of efficiency, cost, feasibility, and
test validity.
Some courts have suggested
that whenever a board fails to
use its own expert to evaluate an
applicant’s medical documenta-
tion, it must defer to any credible
opinion offered by the appli-
cant’s own physician(s) or
expert(s). In D’Amico v. New York
State Board of Law Examiners,39 the
New York board denied the
request of a bar examination
applicant with a visual disability to take the exam
over four days instead of two, but did give her extra
time within the two-day exam period. In finding for
the applicant, the New York federal district court
noted that the board had acted unreasonably in
denying the applicant her requested accommoda-
tions because it failed to obtain and offer any medical
evidence of its own to rebut the recommendations
offered by the applicant’s physician. Similarly, the
Delaware Supreme Court held in In re Petition of Kara
B. Rubenstein40 that the Delaware State Board of Bar
Examiners acted unfairly when it denied an applicant
CONSISTENT WITH RECENT CASE
LAW, BAR EXAMINERS SHOULD
GIVE “PRIMARY CONSIDERATION”
TO THE ACCOMMODATIONS
REQUESTED BY APPLICANTS WITH
DISABILITIES IF THE ACCOMMO-
DATIONS ARE SUPPORTED BY
CREDIBLE MEDICAL OPINION.36
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certain accommodations recommended by her
physician because the board failed to support its
decision with clinical evidence of its own. Thus, it
appears that bar examiners should retain their own
medical experts for the purpose of evaluating accom-
modation requests, especially when contemplating
denying those requests.
The ADA does not require bar examiners to
afford applicants accommodations that compromise
the validity or fairness of the bar examination. For
example, courts have yet to require that a state board
extend accommodations to an applicant if doing so
would make the applicant’s bar examination score
invalid and frustrate the examination’s objective of
measuring “minimal competence” to practice law. In
Florida Board of Law Examiners re: SG,41 an applicant
with attention deficit disorder who was given 25 per-
cent extra time to complete the Florida bar examina-
tion asked the Florida Supreme Court to order the
Florida board to average her part A and part B scores
from two different test administrations. The court
refused, expressing concern over the validity of the
applicant’s final examination score, and holding that
the ADA “does not require modifications that would
fundamentally alter the measurement of the skills or
knowledge [that] the exam is intended to test.”
However, at least one court—the Delaware
Supreme Court—has allowed an applicant to com-
bine scores from two different test administrations.
The petitioner in In re Petition of Kara B. Rubenstein42
had failed the Delaware bar examination three times,
although she did receive a passing Multistate Bar
Examination (MBE) score on her third attempt. The
applicant discovered that she had a learning disabil-
ity and applied to take the examination a fourth time
with accommodations, and the Delaware board allot-
ted her one hour extra for each three-hour essay 
section, but no additional time for the MBE. On her
fourth attempt, the applicant passed the essay exam-
ination but failed the MBE, and the board refused to
certify her for admission to the Delaware bar. She
filed a petition with the Delaware Supreme Court,
asking the court to suspend the requirement that she
pass both the MBE and essay section of the examina-
tion during the same test administration. The court
ruled in the applicant’s favor, stating that the board
had (i) acted inconsistently in giving the applicant
extra time for the essay section but not for the MBE,
and (ii) failed to follow the National Conference of
Bar Examiners’ (NCBE) recommendation that appli-
cants with learning disabilities presumptively
receive time and a half to take the bar examination.
The Delaware court accepted the applicant’s argu-
ment that she had not received the minimum accom-
modations mandated by the ADA.
Courts have made it clear through several rul-
ings that applicants with disabilities must qualify to
sit for the bar examination and pass it, with or with-
out reasonable accommodations, “in spite of” their
disabilities.43 In Anderson v. University of Wisconsin,44 a
case decided under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit noted that the primary issue for a law school
that had denied readmission to a student was not
whether the student could have maintained the
school’s minimum grade point average “but for” his
disability—in that case, alcoholism. The court ruled
in the university’s favor because the law student-
plaintiff could not maintain the minimum grade
point average “in spite of” his disability.45
Courts have also refused to require bar examiners
to reduce passing scores or waive bar examination
requirements altogether for applicants with disabili-
ties. According to the ADA Title II Technical Assistance
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Manual published by the U.S. Department of Justice’s
Office of Civil Rights, “A public entity does not have
to lower or eliminate licensing standards that are
essential to the licensed activity to accommodate an
individual with a disability. Whether a specific
requirement is essential will depend on the facts of
the particular case.”46
At least one federal district court has specifically
ruled that the ADA does not require a state to waive
an objective licensure examination if an applicant
with a disability cannot pass it. In Jacobsen v.
Tillmann,47 the dyslexic plaintiff could not pass the
Pre-Professional Skills Test (PPST) required of all
teachers seeking licensure in Minnesota, even with
“reasonable accommodations.”
In denying her request that the
Minnesota Board of Teaching be
ordered to grant her a teaching
license, the Minnesota federal
district court offered the analogy
of a law school graduate who
could not pass the bar examina-
tion. In both situations, the court
said that a state could require
the objective evaluation of an applicant’s compe-
tence to practice his or her profession as a prerequi-
site to licensure. Because the court’s decision has
solid support in Title II of the ADA, there is no rea-
son to suspect that a different court might waive
passing the bar examination as a prerequisite for a
law school graduate to practice law. 
Similarly, state boards must avoid providing
accommodations to applicants with disabilities that
may give them an unfair advantage. For example, if
the essay section of a state’s bar examination is a
“speeded test,”—that is, if a positive correlation
exists between time allotted and performance on that
section—giving applicants with disabilities unlimit-
ed time on that section would be unfair to the appli-
cants without disabilities. But in practice, it is very
difficult for bar examiners to determine where to
draw the line between leveling the playing field for
applicants with disabilities and giving them an
unfair advantage. As one commentator has noted,
bar examiners can never be certain that giving appli-
cants with disabilities extra time does not affect the
validity of their bar examination scores.48
PART 2: DISABILITIES AND
ACCOMMODATIONS
This section reviews how courts have applied the
ADA to bar examination applicants seeking testing
accommodations for different
types of disabilities. How courts
treat applicants with one type of
impairment offers insight into
how they might treat applicants
with other types of impairments.
However, courts often treat ap-
plicants with the same disability
differently (as should bar exam-
iners), depending upon each applicant’s medical
evaluations and specific accommodation requests.
Visual Impairment
Consistent with the ADA, bar examiners should usu-
ally accommodate an applicant who has a visual dis-
ability with extra time as well as with one or more of
the following: a reader, a scribe, tapes, examination
in Braille or large print, word processing device, or
extra breaks, as recommended by the applicant’s
physician(s) or expert(s).49 When an applicant with a
visual disability presents credible medical evidence
in support of a specific accommodation, a state board
of bar examiners should provide that accommodation.
COURTS HAVE ALSO REFUSED
TO REQUIRE BAR EXAMINERS TO
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In D’Amico v. New York State Board of Law Examiners,50
the New York board denied the request of an appli-
cant who suffered from a severe visual impairment
and acute ocular fatigue that she be allowed to take
the bar examination over four days instead of two,
the accommodation recommended by her ophthal-
mologist. The court agreed with that recommenda-
tion, holding that in light of the applicant’s disabili-
ty, the question of appropriate accommodation was a
“medical” issue and not a “testing” issue. The court
found that because the board failed to present any
medical evidence of its own, it should have acted on
the recommendation of the applicant’s physician. 
On the other hand, bar
examiners are not required to
provide applicants with accom-
modations that might compro-
mise bar examination security,
especially when such accommo-
dations are not requested out of
necessity. In Barr v. National
Conference of Bar Examiners,51
NCBE refused a blind regis-
trant’s request to use a computer
equipped with a voice synthesizer capable of reading
Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination
(MPRE) questions from a computer diskette. NCBE
cited security concerns arising from the potential
copying of the diskette. (Although not mentioned in
the case, we understand that the applicant’s request
for accommodations extended to the MBE.) Instead,
NCBE offered the registrant a range of alternative
accommodations from which to choose, including a
qualified reader, a taped text, and a Braille version of
the examination. The registrant filed a lawsuit under
the ADA, but the federal district court ruled in favor
of NCBE, stating that applicants with disabilities
enjoy only the right to “reasonable” accommodations
in light of their disabilities, with no entitlement to
“preferred” accommodations that might compro-
mise the security of the bar examination. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed
with that finding, but ruled that the registrant’s
appeal was moot because he had already passed the
MPRE without the requested accommodation before
the appeal was heard. 
Chronic Diseases
As a corollary to the recommendation that bar exam-
iners grant accommodation requests supported by
credible medical opinion, bar examiners are not
required to provide accommoda-
tions to applicants beyond those
recommended by the applicant’s
physician(s) or expert(s). The
applicant in Ware v. Wyoming
Board of Bar Examiners,52 who suf-
fered from multiple sclerosis,
requested time and a half, a
legally trained scribe, and a
change of venue for the
Wyoming bar examination. The
board gave her extra time as rec-
ommended by her physician, but not the full time
and a half as requested; the board also offered her a
scribe to transcribe her examination answers and an
additional restroom break. Rather than take the
examination with those accommodations, the appli-
cant filed suit against the board in federal court,
seeking damages and an injunction enjoining the
board from denying her time and venue requests.
The court denied the applicant’s claim, finding that
the accommodations offered by the Wyoming board
were “reasonable" under the ADA. The decision in
Ware stands as another example of a court deferring
to a medical recommendation submitted on behalf of
ON THE OTHER HAND, BAR
EXAMINERS ARE NOT REQUIRED
TO PROVIDE APPLICANTS WITH
ACCOMMODATIONS THAT MIGHT
COMPROMISE BAR EXAMINATION
SECURITY, ESPECIALLY WHEN SUCH
ACCOMMODATIONS ARE NOT
REQUESTED OUT OF NECESSITY.
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an applicant, but in that case, the court’s deference
resulted in the applicant not receiving her requested
accommodations.
Learning Disabilities
Even though learning and other mental disabilities
are explicitly covered in United States Department of
Justice regulations promulgated under the ADA,53 no
firm criteria currently exist for diagnosing applicants
with the same accuracy as the criteria for diagnosing
applicants with physical disabil-
ities. Rather than arising out of
any scientific consensus, many
definitions of learning disabili-
ties in current use are arbitrary
because of the practical necessity
of labeling students in instruc-
tional settings to accommodate
their needs or provide special
programming.54 When confront-
ed with applicant accommoda-
tion requests for learning dis-
abilities, bar examiners must
first decide whether the learning
impairment in question is pro-
tected by the ADA; if so, bar
examiners can then make decisions as to what con-
stitutes “reasonable accommodations” for that
impairment.
The landmark bar examination testing accommo-
dations case on learning disabilities that produced
five separate opinions, Bartlett v. New York State Board
of Law Examiners, illustrates the difficulties that bar
examiners encounter in determining whether an
applicant has a learning “disability” protected by the
ADA. Marilyn Bartlett had taken and failed the New
York bar examination four times, and took and failed
the Pennsylvania bar examination once. Before some
of the sittings of the New York bar examination, she
requested accommodations for her reading disabili-
ty, commonly referred to as dyslexia.55 The New York
Board of Law Examiners denied each timely request
that she submitted, maintaining (as advised by its
expert) that she did not have a “disability” because
she scored above the 30th percentile on two stan-
dardized reading tests. On her fifth attempt at taking
the New York bar examination, the board provided
her time and a half to take the New York part of the
examination (she elected to take
the MBE in Pennsylvania), as
well as use of an amanuensis to
read the test questions to her and
record her responses, and per-
mission to mark her answers to
multiple choice questions directly
in the test booklet. Bartlett and
the New York board stipulated
that even if she passed the exam-
ination with those accommoda-
tions, she would be certified for
admission to the New York bar
only upon prevailing in her 
lawsuit that she had initiated in
federal court against the New
York board. However, she failed the New York bar
examination for the fifth time even with those
accommodations.
After a 21-day trial, the federal district court56
concluded that Bartlett’s reading rate compared
unfavorably with “persons of comparable training,
skills and ability.” From the court’s viewpoint, her
reading impairment “substantially limited” her
capabilities in the “major life activity” of working
because it prevented her from competing fairly on
the bar examination and securing employment in
law—her chosen field. Consequently, the court held
THE LANDMARK BAR EXAMINA-
TION TESTING ACCOMMODATIONS
CASE ON LEARNING DISABILITIES
THAT PRODUCED FIVE SEPARATE
OPINIONS, BARTLETT V. NEW
YORK STATE BOARD OF LAW
EXAMINERS, ILLUSTRATES THE
DIFFICULTIES THAT BAR EXAMIN-
ERS ENCOUNTER IN DETERMINING
WHETHER AN APPLICANT HAS A
LEARNING “DISABILITY” PROTECT-
ED BY THE ADA.
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that Bartlett had a reading “disability,” and that she
was entitled to double time over four days, the use of
a computer, permission to circle multiple choice
answers in her test booklet, and an examination in
large print if she chose to take the New York bar
examination a sixth time. 
The district court did not find that Bartlett’s
reading impairment “substantially limited” her in
the “major life activity” of reading when compared
with the average person in the general population, as
did the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit when it heard the case on appeal.57
The appellate court criticized the board’s arbitrari-
ness in applying “bright-line tests” (the two stan-
dardized reading tests) to deter-
mine that Bartlett’s disability
did not interfere with her “major
life activity” of reading. The
appellate court refused to defer
to the board’s learning disabili-
ties expert in an area outside of
the board’s expertise, which was
testing, and found that Bartlett’s
disability did “substantially
limit” her reading. Despite the fact that the two
courts focused on different life activities, the out-
come of both Bartlett I and Bartlett II were the same:
Bartlett had a “disability” and was entitled to her
requested accommodations.
The United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari and remanded the case to the appellate court
because the Second Circuit had not considered
Bartlett’s ability to self-accommodate (as required by
the recently decided Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc. and
its companion cases).58 In turn, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit asked the
district court on remand whether (i) “Bartlett [was]
substantially limited in the major life activity of read-
ing”; and (ii) “whether it [was] Bartlett’s impairment,
rather than factors such as her education, experience
or innate ability that ‘substantially limit[ed]’ her abil-
ity to work.”59 The district court60 did an about-face in
reasoning without changing its conclusion. After
considering additional testimony, the court ruled
that Bartlett was “disabled” in the “major life activi-
ty” of reading as compared to the average person in
the general population. In reaching that conclusion,
the district court focused on the qualitative rather
than the quantitative effect that her impairment had
on her reading and learning skills. Furthermore, the
court once again found that Bartlett had a “disability”
that “substantially limited” her
in the “major life activity” of
working. The court ordered the
New York board to provide
Bartlett with the accommoda-
tions that she had originally
requested if she chose to retake
the New York bar examination.
At least in its second deci-
sion, the district court expressed
its preference for the subjective and qualitative
observations of Bartlett’s experts to the objective
bright-line measures emphasized by the New York
board. The court thus effectively precluded New
York bar examiners from articulating and applying
objective tests for diagnosing learning disabilities, a
position that courts in other jurisdictions are likely to
follow. In the absence of litigation, applicants with
disabilities are rarely evaluated by board-appointed
experts. Based on Bartlett, a board’s experts now
must analyze and react to subjective medical evalua-
tions conducted by other clinicians and not merely
rely on objective test results. Such a ruling serves to
increase uncertainty among bar examiners regarding
BASED ON BARTLETT, A BOARD’S
EXPERTS NOW MUST ANALYZE
AND REACT TO SUBJECTIVE MED-
ICAL EVALUATIONS CONDUCTED
BY OTHER CLINICIANS AND NOT
MERELY RELY ON OBJECTIVE TEST
RESULTS.
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whether applicants have “disabilities,” resulting in
increased costs and risks. Once again, we find courts
deferring to credible medical opinions offered by an
applicant’s physician(s) or expert(s).61
By contrast, bar examiners have no obligation to
defer to clinical evaluations they do not find credible.
In Haddon v. Montana Board of Bar Examiners,62 the
Montana Supreme Court refused to order the board
to provide the accommodations recommended by
the applicant’s psychologist. The court criticized the
applicant’s psychologist for describing his client’s
“cognitive handicap” (in a letter
to the Montana board) without
providing evidence in support of
his diagnosis of the applicant’s
“learning disability.” The court
found that (i) the psychologist’s
letter was not credible because it
took the form of a legal argu-
ment; and (ii) any applicant with
the plaintiff’s claimed limita-
tions (i.e., difficulties with “con-
cept formation, problem solving,
strategy generation and hypothesis testing”) would
have trouble passing the bar examination even in the
absence of any “disability.”
Because most applicants with learning disabili-
ties ask for extra time, the question arises as to how
much extra time they should be given—another
issue that the courts have yet to respond to with any
consistency. Bar examiners have narrow windows
for error; if they give applicants with disabilities too
much time, they compromise test validity, but if they
provide too little time, they expose themselves to lit-
igation. Further, bar examiners will often be second-
guessed by courts. In Weintraub v. Massachusetts
Board of Bar Examiners (a non-ADA case),63 the
Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts, after an administrative hearing, held
that the appropriate accommodation for an applicant
with a learning disability was double time, and not
the extra thirty minutes per examination section that
the Massachusetts board had offered.
NCBE recommends time and a half as the pre-
sumptive accommodation for applicants with docu-
mented learning disabilities, double time for appli-
cants who have histories of severe impairments, and
a case-by-case determination for applicants with
newly diagnosed disabilities.64 In
one case, the Delaware Supreme
Court criticized its state board of
bar examiners for giving an
applicant with a learning disabil-
ity less than the amount of time
recommended by NCBE.65 But,
while NCBE recommendations
are a useful starting point, the
ADA requires that bar examiners
consider the needs of all appli-
cants on a case-by-case basis.
The difficulty remains for bar examiners in how to
respond appropriately to applicants with various
disabilities while still preserving the validity of test
scores for all applicants.66 Perhaps the best standard
for bar examiners (at least in cases where applicants
have well-documented learning disabilities) is to
align bar examination accommodations with accom-
modations previously afforded to the applicant in
instructional settings—for instance, in law school,
and on standardized tests—for example, on the Law
School Admissions Test (LSAT).67
Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD)
ADHD, of which there are three subtypes (the most
well-known of which is attention deficit disorder, or
BAR EXAMINERS HAVE NARROW
WINDOWS FOR ERROR; IF THEY
GIVE APPLICANTS WITH DISABILI-
TIES TOO MUCH TIME, THEY COM-
PROMISE TEST VALIDITY, BUT IF
THEY PROVIDE TOO LITTLE TIME,
THEY EXPOSE THEMSELVES TO LIT-
IGATION.
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ADD), is a neurobiological disorder that produces
inattentiveness (e.g., poor organization, lack of atten-
tion to detail, easy distraction by external stimuli),
impulsiveness (e.g., not waiting one’s turn, inter-
rupting others), and hyperactivity (e.g., fidgeting,
talking excessively).68 Listed in the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders IV (DSM-IV) as
a psychiatric disorder, ADHD qualifies as a “mental
impairment” under the ADA. ADHD is difficult to
diagnose because, even though it is not a learning
disability, it has similar manifestations, and individ-
uals with ADHD tend to suffer from learning dis-
abilities as well.69 Furthermore, individuals without
disabilities can exhibit inattention, hyperactivity, and
impulsiveness (although not as
consistently as those with
ADHD), as can individuals who
suffer from a variety of other
psychiatric disorders.70 With an
increasing number of ADHD-
related accommodation requests
coming from bar examination
applicants in recent years, bar
examiners face tasks in deter-
mining whether individual
applicants in fact deserve ADA
protection for ADHD. One of the most important and
expensive challenges for bar examiners is evaluating
the broad range of medical documents that bar
examination applicants submit with their ADHD-
related accommodation requests.71
Dr. John Ranseen, an ADHD expert who has con-
sulted with bar examiners on ADHD-related accom-
modation requests, suggests that bar examiners look
at evaluations submitted by applicants who claim
they have ADHD for the following: (i) objective evi-
dence of a developmental history of ADHD, because
ADHD usually begins in childhood; and (ii) evidence
of an impairment that extends beyond an applicant’s
difficulty with taking tests.72 However, like the
judges in the Bartlett cases, Ranseen is skeptical of
experts who rely on objective cognitive tests as the
sole indicator in ADHD evaluations. For applicants
whose ADHD was not diagnosed in childhood, bar
examiners should insist that a comprehensive clini-
cal report (which includes an exhaustive review of
the applicant’s educational background and psycho-
logical testing results) accompany any ADHD-relat-
ed accommodation request.73
The critical question for bar examiners is
whether an applicant with ADHD is “substantially
limited” in the “major life activity” of learning. In
Price v. National Board of Medical
Examiners,74 a West Virginia fed-
eral district court, in comparing
medical students with ADHD to
average persons in the general
population, found that certain
U.S. Medical Licensing Examina-
tion applicants were not “dis-
abled” because they could learn
as well as the average person. The
court found that while the appli-
cants’ impairments affected their abilities to learn,
their superior intellectual capabilities and past aca-
demic performance negated any claim that their
learning was “substantially limit[ed].” Accordingly,
bar examiners who review ADHD evaluations sub-
mitted by bar examination applicants must find evi-
dence that goes beyond an applicant’s difficulties in
law school or in taking tests with time limitations.
Those applicants suffering from an ADHD “disabili-
ty,” as opposed to solely an ADHD “impairment” are
more likely to have histories reflecting significant
academic, employment and interpersonal relation-
ship problems.75
ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT
AND EXPENSIVE CHALLENGES FOR
BAR EXAMINERS IS EVALUATING
THE BROAD RANGE OF MEDICAL
DOCUMENTS THAT BAR EXAMINA-
TION APPLICANTS SUBMIT WITH
THEIR ADHD-RELATED ACCOM-
MODATION REQUESTS.71
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Once bar examiners decide that an applicant’s
ADHD is a “disability,” Dr. Ranseen recommends
that they look for reasonable evidence that the
requested accommodations are intended to “amelio-
rate [the] disability . . . [and] not simply to provide
hope of improved test performance.”76 One common
myth is that all individuals with ADHD require sep-
arate testing rooms in order to minimize distrac-
tions;77 further, as with learning disabilities, no evi-
dence exists showing that extra time does anything
more than give applicants with ADHD an unfair
advantage that affects test validity.78 With an increase
in the number of clinicians acting as advocates for
bar examination applicants diagnosed with ADHD,
bar examiners must require documentation that
clearly shows the extent of an applicant’s past diffi-
culty with test taking, as well as past accommoda-
tions provided to the applicant in instructional set-
tings.79
Test Anxiety
While it has no uniform definition, one expert has
defined test anxiety as a combination of subjective
distress (e.g., fear, apprehension), physical symp-
toms (e.g., trembling, sweating, clammy hands, voice
tremors, muscular tension, increased heart rate), neg-
ative thoughts (e.g., “I cannot pass this test,” “I am a
failure”), and cognitive impairment (e.g., the anxiety
causes a test taker’s mind to go blank).80 Bar exami-
nation applicants seeking accommodations for test
anxiety present at least two challenges for bar exam-
iners: (i) to determine whether those applicants have
“mental impairments” as defined by the ADA; and
(ii) if so, to evaluate whether the impairments “sub-
stantially limit[] one or more [of the applicant’s]
major life activities.” 
The ADA and the regulations promulgated
thereunder contain no reference to test anxiety. The
legislative history of the ADA directs courts to the
DSM-IV as the authoritative source regarding which
disorders qualify as “mental impairments.”81 While
the DSM-IV has no definition for test anxiety, at least
one expert has classified it within the DSM-IV cate-
gory of “social phobia,”82 which would qualify it as a
“mental impairment” under the ADA. The lack of
federal case law on test anxiety precludes certainty
as to whether courts would agree with that classifi-
cation, or whether courts would even consider test
anxiety “a mental impairment” at all.
Even if test anxiety is an “impairment,” bar
examination applicants seeking accommodations
face a much more difficult task in proving that the
impairment “substantially limits one or more major
life activities.” They have two possible arguments: (i)
test anxiety interferes with the “major life activity” of
thinking; and (ii) test anxiety interferes with the
“major life activity” of working.83 The problem with
the first argument is that courts will not likely rule
that an applicant’s test anxiety “substantially limits”
his or her thinking, when by definition it limits
thinking only in the context of test taking.84
Regarding the second argument, bar examination
applicants might claim that test anxiety “substantial-
ly limits” them in the “major life activity” of working
because it prevents them from passing the bar exam-
ination, and therefore from practicing their chosen
profession.85 However, the United States Supreme
Court has ruled that an “impairment” does not “sub-
stantially limit” an individual’s ability to work when
it excludes the individual from only “one type of job,
a specialized job or a job of choice.”86 Thus, it is
doubtful that a court would accept a bar examination
applicant’s argument that he or she is disabled
because test anxiety precludes him or her from prac-
ticing law, especially in light of the narrow definition
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of “disability” articulated by the United States
Supreme Court.
At least one court has ruled that test anxiety is
not a “disability” under the ADA. In McGuinness v.
University of New Mexico School of Medicine,87 a med-
ical student wanted accommodations for his chem-
istry and mathematics examinations because of the
level of anxiety he had experienced during previous
exams in those subject areas. The medical school
refused to accommodate him and the federal appel-
late court agreed, ruling that the student did not
have a “disability.” The court
reasoned that the student’s anxi-
ety did not “substantially limit
one or more of his major life
activities” because he had al-
ready earned a bachelor’s de-
gree in chemistry and physics, a
degree in physiological psychol-
ogy, and a doctorate in clinical
psychology, and he had work
experience as a practicing clini-
cal psychologist.
With the U.S. Supreme Court restricting the
scope of the ADA, bar examiners appear to have
increasing justification for not granting accommoda-
tions to applicants whose text anxiety symptoms do
not interfere with aspects of their lives outside of
testing. However, if applicants with text anxiety
request separate rooms for taking the bar examina-
tion (which alleviates test anxiety for many appli-
cants),88 bar examiners can grant such accommoda-
tions with minimal cost and without much threat to
test score validity. But, if those same applicants
request extra time, bar examiners must make diffi-
cult distinctions between those individuals who are
simply anxious about taking the bar examination
and those with documented histories of test anxiety.
For the latter group, it is likely that bar examiners
need only offer accommodations when the test anxiety
affects the applicants in aspects of their lives outside
of the examination room.
PART 3: ADA LITIGATION ISSUES
A major challenge for bar examiners and applicants
who litigate ADA-related claims is untangling the
current web of unresolved constitutional, jurisdic-
tional, and procedural issues that arise in such litiga-
tion. The most important of these
issues are discussed below. 
Procedural Due Process
With one exception, courts have
yet to decide whether bar exami-
nation applicants with disabili-
ties have a constitutional right to
hearings before state boards of
bar examiners refuse their
requests for testing accommoda-
tions.89 The lone exception is the
Delaware Supreme Court, which
considered the issue outside the context of the ADA.
In In re Petition of Thomas E. Cahill,90 that court found
that the Delaware Board of Bar Examiners had vio-
lated an applicant’s Fourteenth Amendment right to
procedural due process when it denied his request
for “special accommodations” without granting him
a hearing. Despite acknowledging that the board had
consulted its own expert who concluded that the
applicant did not have a disability, the court ruled
that the applicant had a right to a hearing as to the
factual issue of whether he, in fact, was disabled. At
least in part, the court based its decision on existing
board rules giving applicants the right to a hearing 
to resolve factual disputes regarding character and
WITH ONE EXCEPTION, COURTS
HAVE YET TO DECIDE WHETHER
BAR EXAMINATION APPLICANTS
WITH DISABILITIES HAVE A CON-
STITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HEARINGS
BEFORE STATE BOARDS OF BAR
EXAMINERS REFUSE THEIR
REQUESTS FOR TESTING ACCOM-
MODATIONS.89
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fitness, and a right to a hearing to request a discre-
tionary fifth opportunity to take the Delaware bar
examination. After the decision in Cahill, the
Delaware Board of Bar Examiners promulgated Rule
29 91 establishing procedural due process for appli-
cants with disabilities who seek testing accommoda-
tions. Board Rule 29 refers to an older rule (Rule 15,
regarding “special accommodations”) in stating that
“[i]f an application has not been approved by the
Board because there exists disputed issues of fact
with regard to the subject matter of . . . Board of Bar
Examiners . . . Rule 15 . . . the applicant may petition
the Board for a hearing.” 
Regardless of whether the ADA requires hearings
in connection with denials of testing accommodations,
it is likely that the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment requires bar examiners to
consider requests for accommodations on a case-by-
case basis. Under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, the
U.S. Department of Justice issued an administrative
civil rights opinion regarding the Hawaii Board of
Education’s policy for special education students.92
The Department noted that the due process clause
requires educators to evaluate disabilities on a case-
by-case basis because the needs of special education
students vary, even among students suffering from
the same disability.93 There is little reason to doubt
that bar examiners must do the same under the ADA
because the ADA rejects categorization of persons by
“disability” in favor of considering the unique needs
of each individual.94
Federal and State Court Jurisdiction
No universal answer exists regarding whether appli-
cants with disabilities should litigate claims related
to testing accommodations in state or federal court, as
the answer largely depends on the jurisdiction in which
the applicant applies to sit for the bar examination.
In certain states, such as New Jersey, the state
supreme court has delegated all administrative
authority for bar examinations to the state board of
bar examiners; therefore, in New Jersey and other
such states, boards do not allow appeals arising from
their decisions on testing accommodations.95
Applicants in those states have no choice but to file
their claims in federal district court, despite the limi-
tations that Eleventh Amendment immunity places
on recovery. 
However, a federal district court might invoke
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to refuse consideration
of an applicant’s claim, even though some federal
courts, despite the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, have
afforded injunctive relief to applicants seeking 
reasonable accommodations under the ADA.96 The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine arose from the decisions in
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.97 and D.C. Court of Appeals
v. Feldman.98 In Rooker, the United States Supreme
Court recognized that federal district court jurisdic-
tion is original, and therefore lower federal courts
could not hear appeals of final decisions by state
supreme courts. In Feldman, the Court held that deci-
sions by the D.C. Court of Appeals (the highest court
in the District of Columbia) regarding bar admis-
sions constituted final judicial decisions and as such,
could be reviewed only by the United States
Supreme Court and not by federal district or inter-
mediate appellate courts. In so deciding, the Court
extended its previous ruling in Rooker to the District
of Columbia, even though it is not a state. Those two
decisions preclude any federal court (apart from the
United States Supreme Court) from reviewing the
final decisions of state courts, even when those deci-
sions raise federal issues.
There is reason to think that the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine does not apply to litigation initiated by bar
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examination applicants in states like New Jersey,
where full authority for bar admissions is delegated
to state boards. First, the doctrine applies only to
final decisions made by state supreme courts, and
the decisions of bar examiners to deny testing 
accommodations are always made before applicants
take the bar examination and before state supreme
courts either certify or do not certify applicants for
admission to the state bar.99 Second, the doctrine bars
appeals only from judicial decisions; the denial of
testing accommodations is most likely administra-
tive rather than judicial because bar examiners do
not hold hearings before making such decisions,
unlike hearings before an adverse character and fit-
ness review.100 Last, a board’s adverse decision on
testing accommodations does not, in and of itself,
deny an applicant a substantive right (i.e., the right
to practice law). Just as the New York and Wyoming
federal courts exercised jurisdiction over applicants’
claims related to the denial of testing accommoda-
tions,101 it is likely that a federal district court would
exercise jurisdiction over any similar claim by a bar
examination applicant.
However, in many other states, such as
Delaware, applicants have the right to appeal
adverse decisions on testing accommodations to the
state supreme court after taking and failing the bar
examination. In such states, applicants probably can-
not seek relief in federal court after exhausting their
state law remedies, which they must do under feder-
al law.102 Once such an applicant has a hearing and
subjects him or herself to a state supreme court rul-
ing, an effort to obtain relief in federal court would
trigger the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and bar federal
court jurisdiction. In those jurisdictions, the appli-
cant’s only federal avenue of appeal would be to the
United States Supreme Court on a petition of certiorari.
State Immunity
The question of whether bar examination applicants
may recover monetary damages in ADA lawsuits
brought against state boards of bar examiners in fed-
eral court has not been resolved. The Eleventh
Amendment of the United States Constitution ren-
ders states and state officers who act in their official
capacities immune from suits for monetary damages
initiated by private individuals in federal court.103
However, Congress is empowered to abrogate that
immunity under Section V of the Fourteenth
Amendment to remedy a pattern of irrational state
discrimination.104 In Board of Trustees of the University
of Alabama v. Garrett,105 the United States Supreme
Court found that Congress lacked the authority to
abrogate state immunity under Title I (employment)
of the ADA. The Court held that the Eleventh
Amendment precluded state employees from suing
non-consenting states in federal court for monetary
damages under Title I. However, the Court explicitly
limited its holding in Garrett to suits for monetary
damages against state employers, and noted that
employees could still seek injunctive relief against
state officials in federal court. 
It is possible that the United States Supreme
Court will decide whether the Eleventh Amendment
immunizes state entities (including boards of bar
examiners) from suit under Title II of the ADA. The
Court granted certiorari to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to consider the issue in
Medical Board of California v. Hason,106 but then dis-
missed the case. The Court may find that Congress
did not have the authority to enact Title II because it
failed to show a pattern of state discrimination
against persons with disabilities in the provision of
public services. Regardless of whether and how the
Court decides that issue, bar examination applicants
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with disabilities would still be able to seek injunctive
relief against individual bar examiners under Title II
of the ADA, and possibly be able to seek monetary
damages and injunctive relief against state boards
under Title III.
Injunctive Relief
Bar examination applicants with disabilities who are
denied testing accommodations might, however,
face obstacles in obtaining injunctive relief.
Applicants who litigate under the ADA often seek
preliminary injunctions enjoining state boards from
denying them certain “reasonable accommodations”
on the subsequent administration of the bar exami-
nation. But even when applicants with disabilities
present meritorious substantive claims under the
ADA (a likelihood of success on the merits), they
must show that irreparable harm would result if an
injunction were not granted.107 If
an applicant with a disability has
yet to sit for the bar examination
at the time of seeking injunctive
relief, a court could find that no
irreparable harm would occur if
the applicant failed the bar
examination on the first try,108
and consequently postpone any
decision on injunctive relief until after the applicant
has taken the examination without the requested
accommodations. If the applicant passes, the issue is
moot; if the applicant fails, the court can issue an
injunction in anticipation of the next administration
of the bar examination.
Two federal district court decisions illustrate
those obstacles. In Pazer v. New York State Board of 
Law Examiners,109 a New York federal district court
considered an applicant’s position as a first-year 
associate in a Manhattan law firm as one factor in its
finding that the applicant would not suffer irrepara-
ble harm if his request for testing accommodations
were rejected. Similarly, in Christian v. New York State
Board of Law Examiners,110 another New York federal
district court found that a delay in a bar examination
applicant’s legal career that could result from the
applicant not receiving reasonable accommodations
and failing the New York bar examination once was
insufficient proof of irreparable harm, and that any
harm could be remedied with monetary relief. The
court failed to note that the applicant might not be
able to recover monetary damages if the Garrett
rationale were to apply to Title II of the ADA.
Attorneys’ Fees
The ADA contains a provision that allows the “pre-
vailing party” in ADA-related litigation to recover
attorneys’ fees from the losing party.111 In Buckhannon
Board & Care Home, Inc. v. West
Virginia Department of Health and
Human Resources,112 the United
States Supreme Court rejected
the “catalyst theory” adopted by
many lower courts, under which
a plaintiff in an ADA-related
lawsuit could recover attorneys’
fees even if the case settled pre-
judgment, as long as the plaintiff had induced a vol-
untary change in the defendant’s conduct.113 The
Court limited the circumstances under which a pre-
vailing plaintiff could recover fees to those in which
the plaintiff had secured a judgment or favorable
court-sanctioned consent decree.114 Because of
Buckhannon, bar examiners have greater incentive to
settle applicants’ ADA claims because they no longer
run the risk of a court ordering them to pay the
applicant’s attorneys’ fees after a settlement.115
HOWEVER, BECAUSE FEDERAL
LAW ON TESTING ACCOMMODA-
TIONS IS IN A STATE OF FLUX, BAR
EXAMINERS SHOULD KEEP ABREAST
OF NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN
ADA-RELATED LITIGATION.
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Statute of Limitations
At least one federal circuit court has suggested that
the statute of limitations in testing accommodations
cases tolls at the occurrence of the discriminatory act
(the denial of testing accommodations), and not
when the applicant fails the examination. In Soignier
v. American Board of Plastic Surgery,116 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held
that the limitations period for the applicant’s cause
of action arising under the ADA began to toll when
the American Board of Plastic Surgery denied his
request for accommodations on the oral plastic surgery
exam and not when he failed the exam.117
PART 4: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BAR
EXAMINERS
The following recommendations will help bar exam-
iners comply with the ADA. However, because federal
law on testing accommodations is in a state of flux,
bar examiners should keep abreast of new develop-
ments in ADA-related litigation.
1. Individual boards should make their
ADA testing accommodation policies
available to all applicants in written
form. These policies should state proce-
dures for applicants with disabilities to
follow when making their accommoda-
tion requests, the standards used to eval-
uate those requests, and the appeal pro-
cedure, should any of those requests be
denied.118 Ideally, bar examiners should
include hard copies of their policies in all
registration materials sent to applicants
and law schools, in addition to posting
the policies on their websites. 
2. Accommodation request deadlines
should be set well in advance of test
administration dates. Examiners need
sufficient time to review requests, consult
with outside medical experts, and ask
applicants for supplemental information
or documentation if necessary. Likewise,
bar examiners should notify applicants
of adverse decisions early enough to
accommodate appeals prior to test
administration dates.
3. Boards of bar examiners should provide
applicants with detailed descriptions of
all information and documentation re-
quired to support their accommodation
requests. It is in the interest of boards to
be as specific as possible regarding what
they require in the way of medical evalu-
ations and medical histories for different
disabilities, especially as to mental dis-
abilities, which are harder to diagnose
and document than physical disabilities.
Boards should not hesitate to seek sup-
plemental information or documentation
from applicants whose initial submis-
sions are inadequate. It is against the
interests of bar examiners to leave deci-
sions regarding documentation to the
discretion of individual applicants.
Specific requirements will allow boards
to defend more easily requests for sup-
plemental information from applicants,
should legal challenges arise.
4. Boards should establish criteria to deter-
mine on a case-by-case basis whether a
“disability” exists and what are “reason-
able” accommodations for that disability.
Such criteria may include a list of pre-
sumptive accommodations for various
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disabilities. The criteria may be more
detailed than the testing accommodation
policies provided to applicants. However,
to withstand judicial scrutiny, bar exam-
iners should not include objective bright-
line tests among their criteria. 
5. If a board of bar examiners is inclined to
reject an applicant’s requested accommo-
dations despite the presence of all
required medical information and docu-
mentation, it is imperative that the board
consult with an independent medical
expert to support its decision. The expert
should, at a minimum, review the appli-
cant’s file, and if the board denies the
request(s), the expert should be prepared
to testify as to why the accommodations
recommended by the applicant’s physi-
cian(s) or expert(s) are medically “unrea-
sonable.”
PART 5: CHARACTER AND FITNESS
The ADA also affects character and fitness investiga-
tions, though not to the same extent that it affects
testing accommodations. Most disabilities do not
trigger concerns about applicants’ character and fit-
ness, and most concerns about applicants’ character
and fitness do not relate to disabilities. However, the
degree to which bar examiners can inquire into an
applicant’s mental health history has been heavily
litigated. In the 1990s, there were a number of chal-
lenges to character and fitness applications that
asked applicants about their mental health histories
despite that certain applicants had mental impair-
ments that had no bearing on their fitness to practice
law. As a result of those successful challenges, boards
have largely limited their mental health questions to
specific queries about serious mental illness that
could impact the applicant’s ability to practice law. 
Jurisdiction
While applicants in most states who are denied test-
ing accommodations have no right to an evidentiary
hearing or review by the state supreme court, appli-
cants are generally entitled to both a hearing before
the state board’s character and fitness committee and
review by the state supreme court before they are
denied licensure because of unsuitable character and
fitness. Until applicants exhaust all appeals in the
state system, the federal courts will abstain. In
Edwards v. Illinois Board of Admissions to the Bar,119 the
Illinois board denied a hearing to an applicant who
had received treatment for major depression because
she refused to sign a blanket medical release author-
izing access to her mental health records. Although
the Illinois board eventually offered her a hearing
despite the fact that she did not sign the release, the
Illinois federal district court to which she applied for
relief refused to intervene and dictate the extent to
which bar examiners could consider the applicant’s
mental health records. The court abstained, noting
that the applicant could only exercise her right of
review before the state supreme court. 
The federal district court in that case found that
the abstention doctrine applies when: (i) there is a
pending state proceeding; (ii) a compelling state
interest is at stake; and (iii) the complaining party
has the ability to raise his or her federal claims in a
state court hearing. The court abstained after finding
that: (i) state proceedings regarding attorney licen-
sure are judicial in nature; (ii) the state has a com-
pelling interest in assessing and ensuring the profes-
sional conduct of the attorneys it licenses; and (iii)
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the applicant has a right of review of her claim before
the state supreme court. 
However, applicants must also contend with the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which bars federal courts,
except the United States Supreme Court, from
reviewing character and fitness decisions rendered
after board hearings and state supreme court review.
In Campbell v. Greisberger,120 the state board and state
supreme court rejected the character and fitness
application of an applicant with schizophrenia, but
the applicant was told that he could reapply for
admission to the state bar if he could present new
evidence of his fitness to practice law. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled
that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the federal
district court from reviewing decisions of the state
character and fitness committee and supreme court
that related only to an individual applicant. 
The court in Campbell, however, noted that feder-
al district courts did have jurisdiction over general
challenges to character and fitness application ques-
tions or procedures related to all applicants. For
example, in Ellen S. v. Florida Board of Bar Examiners,121
the federal court struck down the Florida board’s
character and fitness question about mental health
history as overbroad, exercising jurisdiction over the
case because the applicant was making a general
challenge to a question directed at all applicants
rather than asking for review of her individual case.
Similarly, in Roe No. 2 v. Ogden,122 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that the
lower federal court had jurisdiction over general
challenges to the Colorado board’s character and fit-
ness questions about past treatment for drug, alco-
hol, and narcotic use, and mental illness—all of
which triggered the submission of additional infor-
mation if they were answered affirmatively. 
Mental Health Inquiries
Boards of bar examiners may ask applicants narrow-
ly tailored questions about their mental health histo-
ries as long as those questions are related to the
applicants’ fitness to practice law. For example, in
Applicants v. Texas State Board of Law Examiners,123 the
Texas federal district court found that the state
board’s character and fitness question to applicants
about adolescent or adult histories of “bipolar disor-
der, schizophrenia, paranoia, and psychotic disor-
ders” did not run afoul of the ADA. The court
approved the state board’s practice of further inves-
tigating the mental health histories of applicants who
had such “serious mental illnesses” because those ill-
nesses could affect applicants’ fitness to practice law.
The court distinguished the Texas board’s practice
from those involving questions that asked applicants
about their mental health histories regardless of
what mental illness they had and during what time
frame. 
Two decisions from a Virginia federal district
court illustrate the limits on character and fitness
inquiries into applicants’ mental health histories. In
Clark v. Virginia Board of Bar Examiners,124 the court
struck down as overbroad a question that asked,
“Have you[,] within the past five (5) years, been
treated or counseled for a mental, emotional or nerv-
ous disorder[s]?” An affirmative response necessitat-
ed that the applicant answer an additional set of
questions about his or her mental health history. The
court found that the Virginia board, in its use of men-
tal health questions similar to the types of questions
asked in eighteen states, discriminated against appli-
cants with mental illness by singling them out on the
basis of their illnesses instead of evaluating them on
the basis of characteristics that could affect their fit-
ness to practice law. 
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After Clark, the Virginia board rewrote the ques-
tion to read: 
Within the past five years, have you been
diagnosed with or have you been treated for
any of the following: schizophrenia or any
other psychotic disorder, delusional disor-
der, bipolar or manic depressive mood disor-
der, major depression, antisocial personality
disorder, or any other condition which sig-
nificantly impaired your behavior, judgment,
understanding, capacity to recognize reality,
or ability to function in school, work or other
important life activities?
In O’Brien v. Virginia Board of Bar Examiners,125 the
court refused to enjoin the Virginia board from ask-
ing the revised question and seeking a release of
medical records from applicants who answered the
question affirmatively. The court found that the
revised question was “carefully tailored to respect
the privacy rights of the individual applicant.” The
court concluded that the plaintiff was not likely to
succeed on the merits of his case because the Virginia
question and release sought only medical records rel-
evant to the applicant’s fitness to practice law. 
Independent Determination
In Rothman v. Emory University,126 an applicant with a
seizure disorder brought an action against the uni-
versity and law school from where he graduated. He
claimed that the school’s dean, in the applicant’s
school certification sent to the Illinois board, wrote
how the applicant was openly hostile to students and
faculty members during his time at the school
because of his chronic epilepsy. The federal district
court found that the applicant had stated a viable
claim under the ADA against the university because
the university would have violated the ADA if the 
dean had given the applicant a bad or qualified 
recommendation due to his disability or his com-
plaints about the law school’s disability policies. The
applicant filed his case only after the Illinois board
had required the applicant to interview with the
state’s character and fitness committee, the commit-
tee had deemed him fit to practice law, and he was
admitted to practice law in Illinois. The Illinois board
did what other boards should do in similar situa-
tions: make an independent determination as to an
applicant’s fitness to practice law rather than risk
relying strictly on outside assessments that could be
influenced by the applicant’s disability.
CONCLUSION
The ADA has presented bar examiners with new
challenges in providing appropriate testing accom-
modations for bar examination applicants with dis-
abilities. Whether an applicant has a disability, and,
if so, what reasonable accommodations should be
afforded the applicant, are complex, novel, fact-spe-
cific inquiries that bar examiners need to consider
within the infrastructure of the ADA and the regula-
tions promulgated thereunder. The recommenda-
tions provided in this article will hopefully assist bar
examiners and bar administrators in complying with
the ADA and avoiding ADA-related litigation. 
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